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BOOK REVIEWS
The University Portfolio and Social Responsibility
THE

ETHICAL

INVESTOR:

UNIVERSITIES

AND

CORPORATE

By John G. Simon, Charles W. Powers & Jon P.
Gunnemann. New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1972, Pp.
x, 208. $9.50 (paper, $2.95).
RESPONSIBILITY.

Justice Louis D. Brandeis characterized the modern corporation as
"the master institution of civilized life."' In light of the actual and
potential impact of such an institution, it is hardly surprising that concern over the proper scope of corporate activity and responsibility for
its conduct dates almost as far back as the origins of the corporation
itself.
In the late nineteenth century, this concern over corporate activity
in the United States focused primarily on enactment and enforcement
of the antitrust laws. In the early years of the twentieth century, courts
were occasionally forced to deal with social issues raised in shareholders' derivative actions, but the cases were few and far between. Systematic analysis of the problems of corporate responsibility did not really
get under way until the publication in 1932 of The Modern Corporation
and Private Property, by Adolph A. Berle and Gardiner Means. The
fundamental purpose of this seminal and prophetic book was to demonstrate the distance between the legal theory of corporate control and the
realities of corporate life in the United States. Today most minority
shareholders who seek to instill a sense of social responsibility in corporate managers acknowledge the continued existence of the gap documented by Berle and Means and the futility of attempts to reassert
shareholder control. The objective of these shareholders is to persuade;
their method is to arouse public opinion and bring to bear on corporate
management the full weight of all favorable pressures that can be generated, including the considerable leverage which institutional investors
can potentially exert.
It is no secret that the percentage of shares of common stock of
I.

Liggett v. Lee, 288 U.S. 517, 565 (1933). Justice Brandeis was quoting from T.
86 (1923).
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American corporations held by institutions of one sort or another has
risen dramatically in recent years, although there are few, if any, major
corporations of which institutions own a majority of the stock.2 To
speak of "institutional investors" in the context of the corporate responsibility debate, however, is to say very little because there are so many
different kinds of institutions, each type subject to differing legal, moral,
and political constraints and pressures. At one extreme are banks and
mutual funds, whose freedom to take any action that might adversely
affect the return to trust beneficiaries or investors is rigidly circumscribed. On the other end of the spectrum are foundations whose charitable purposes are so broadly defined as to give their managers virtually
complete freedom to advance social causes at the expense of portfolio
performance. The churches, universities, and other single-purpose charities fall between the two extremes and find themselves caught between
the legal obligation to maximize investment return and a countervailing
desire to respond in some way to the will of their constitutents and to
the needs of society. In The Ethical Investor, Messrs. Simon, Powers,
and Gunnemann have limited themselves to an examination of the
problems of the university as an institutional investor, but every institutional investment manager who takes the problem of corporate responsibility seriously should find the book valuable.
Much of the initial awareness that universities may have a significant role in attempts to instill a sense of social responsibility in corportate management come as a result of student activism. The concern of college students for the solution of social problems is not new.
What is new about the concern of the current generation of students,
which may be dated very roughly from the Greensboro sit-ins in 1960,1
is its breadth, depth, and scope. Very simply, more students have deeper
feeings about many more problems, and the problems themselves are
of unprecedented technological and sociological complexity. As early as
1960, students were aware of at least some of the implications of corpo2. During the period 1960-69, the estimated share volume of institutional investors on the
New York Stock Exchange rose from approximately 360,000,000 shares (28% of the total public
volume) to nearly 2,300,000,000 shares (more than 50%). SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMM'N,
INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR STUDY REPORT, H.R. Doc. No. 92-64, 92nd Cong., Ist Sess. 2167-68
(1971).
3. On February i, 1960, 4 black college students from Agricultural & Technical College of

North Carolina attempted to obtain service at a F.W. Woolworth Company's lunch counter in
Greensboro, North Carolina. N.Y. Times, Feb. 5, 1960, § 1, at 12, col. 3. Four days later a
number of white college students joined the protest, which then spread to S.H. Kress & Company.
N.Y. Times, Feb. 6, 1960, § 1, at 20, col. 1. Finally, on July 25, segregation ended at the lunch
counters of the Woolworth and Kress stores when the manager of each store agreed to begin service

on an integrated basis. N.Y. Times, July 26, 1960, § 1, at 1, col. 8.
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rate activity, as evidenced by the Greensboro sit-ins having touched off

picketing at the northern outlets of the retail store chains involved.4 Not
until the Kodak controversy in 1967, 5 however, was the anger and frustration of students directed against their own colleges and universities,
which as institutional investors were thought to be somehow implicated

in corporate conduct. Another important change occurred in 1970 when
the leaders of Campaign GM made the first serious attempt to organize
and coordinate efforts to force shareholder action on campuses across
the country.6 Since 1967, university trustees have found themselves

asked to make many complex "investment" decisions of a very new sort.
The issues have included apartheid and other forms of racial discrimination in South Africa, 7 strip mining s pollution control,' the manufacture
4. N.Y. Times, July 26, 1960, § 1, at I, col. 8.
5. FIGHT (Freedom, Integration, God, Honor-Today), a militant black organization
formed by the late Saul D. Alinsky in Rochester, New York, deadlocked with Eastman Kodak
over a proposed program to hire and train 600 blacks in December 1966. In March 1967 FIGHT
purchased 10 shares of Eastman Kodak stock. FIGHT then mailed 700 letters to various clergymen
and civil rights groups urging them to contact fellow stockholders to protest Kodak's action in a
controversial "contract agreement" between Kodak and FIGHT. N.Y. Times, April 7, 1967, § 1,
at 1, col. 7. At the annual stockholders meeting, FIGHT was unsuccessful in forcing Kodak to
honor any previous "agreements"; nevertheless, Kodak subsequently hired a black advertising
public relations firm and emphasized its intention of recruiting and training additional blacks.
6. Campaign GM was formed by Ralph Nader. Its announced goal was to make General
Motors more responsive to the public. Nader's colleagues on the project purchased 12 shares of
GM stock. Subsequently they proposed the following 3 shareholder resolutions: first, to expand
the Board of Directors of General Motors from 24 to 27 and include 3 representatives of the general
public; secondly, to establish a shareholders' committee for corporate responsibility; thirdly, to
have the corporation undertake no business activities that were detrimental to the health, safety,
or welfare of United States citizens. N.Y. Times, Feb. 8, 1970, § 1, at 44, col. 1. All 3 of these
resolutions were defeated soundly at the annual stockholders meeting, but GM subsequently took
action consistent with those resolutions. N.Y. Times, May 23, 1970, § I, at 15, col. 1. For an
extensive analysis of the first 2 phases of Campaign GM by a law professor who participated in
the project see Schwartz, The Public-InterestProxy Contest: Reflections on Campaign GM, 69
MICH. L. REv. 419 (1970); Schwartz, Towards New CorporateGoals: Co-Existence with Society,
60 GEo. L.J. 57 (1971).
7. N.Y. Times, Aug. 23, 1972, § 1, at 1, col. I (World Council of Churches voted to
liquidate its financial stake in all corporations doing business with South Africa); N.Y. Times,
Aug. 19, 1972, § 1, at 33, col. 3 (investigation of role of black workers in United States corporations' subsidiaries located in South Africa indicates that only about 10% are attempting to improve
the lot of black workers). See also Unterhalter, The "PolaroidExperiment" in South Africa-A
Progress Report, 6 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 109 (1972).
8. E.g., Natural Resources Defense Council v. TVA, 340 F. Supp. 40 (S.D.N.Y.), rev'd 459
F.2d 255 (2d Cir. 1972) (action to enjoin TVA's involvement in strip mining; reversed because New
York was not a place of proper venue); Lomayaktewa v. Morton, Civil No. 974-71 (D.D.C., filed
May 14, 1971) (attempt to invalidate Interior Department's approval of a lease of Hopi tribal lands
on Black Mesa for strip mining coal). For a discussion of this case see 1 E.L.R. 65171 (1971).
9. Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91 (1972) (holding that there is a federal common
law of pollution control); Washington v. General Motors, 406 U.S. 109 (1972) (action by 18 states
against the Nation's 4 major automobile manufacturers alleging conspiracy to impede research and
development of automotive air pollution control devices).
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of antipersonnel weapons," and discrimination in hiring.'
Initially there was considerable confusion and irritation, and, on a
number of campuses, outright confrontations over issues of corporate
responsibility threatened to halt normal academic activity. Nearly every
major institution ultimately responded by appointing a committee to
study the problem and to make recommendations for the establishment
of procedures to ensure that responses to future requests for institutional
action would be orderly and thoughtful. The most comprehensive study
to date is the subject of this review, a report to the Yale Corporation
which grew out of an interdisciplinary seminar on corporate responsibility led by the study's authors in 1969-70.
The scope of the report is rather limited. It does not, for example,
purport to examine the vast range of possibilities for institutional investment in activities such as low-income housing construction, that are
directed toward the accomplishment of social goals rather than maximization of investment return. Moreover, the authors assume at the outset
that in a complex 2 industrial society there can be no such thing as a
"clean" portfolio.' Their principal concerns are whether the university
as shareholder should try to influence the behavior of corporations,
whether it may legally do so, the range of possible action, and the nature
of the decision-making process.
A more fundamental question is whether corporations have any
real social responsibilities. If not, then it is a moot point whether an
institutional investor can be implicated, in any meaningful sense, in
corporate conduct. The authors conclude that corporations do have an
obligation to avoid and correct social injury-but only to the extent that
the societal harm is caused by the corporation itself. They call this
negative injunction a "moral minimum." Affirmative duties may play
an important role for individuals, but they have no place in the corporate moral scheme. This distinction is extremely useful as an aid to the
analysis of corporate responsibility problems. Consider, for example,
the familiar statement that the sole purpose of corporate existence is the
10.

State ex rel. Pillsbury v. Honeywell, Inc., 291 Minn. 322, 191 N.W.2d 406 (1971)

(shareholder's attempt to inspect munition manufacturer's shareholders list to communicate with
other shareholders regarding his opposition to the corporation's production of war materials).
For a discussion of this case see 25 VAND. L. REv. 425 (1972).
11. Wall Street J., Jan. 31, 1973, at 1, col. 3, (EEOC charges NBC with discrimination
against women in its hiring); Wall Street J., Dec. 14, 1972, at 4, col. 3 (EEOC charges Mobil Oil
Co. with discrimination against women in its hiring); Wall Street J., Aug. 24, 1972, at 8, col. 2
(class action filed charging 32 firms with discrimination against women in hiring).
12. A devastating critique of the "clean portfolio" concept may be found in Malkiel &
Quandt, Moral Issues in Investment Policy, HARV. Bus. REv. 37 (March-April 1971).
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maximization of profit. 13 Attempts to accomplish objectives that are
incompatible with profit maximization are, according to the profit advocates, definitionally impossible. Moreover, they frequently assert that
the corporation is singularly unfit to promote the general welfare and
will probably fail in its attempt. These arguments, with several variations, simply have no relevance to the problem of corporate responsibility in the limited Simon-Powers-Gunnemann sense. Similarly, in discussions of highly competitive industries in which harmful practices are
widespread, it is often argued not only that it is unrealistic to expect
individual firms to adopt measures that put them at a competitive disadvantage but also that the resulting social injury from unemployment
might well be worse than that resulting from the pollution. Applying the
moral minimum criterion, one can admit all of this and nevertheless find
fault with corporations in such an industry. The pollution is "selfcaused" to the extent that the industry has not taken steps to find
solutions, and individual firms may be faulted for failure to encourage
industry-wide action."
Having made a case for corporate responsibility, the authors must
still make a case for university shareholder action. Invoking a complex
tripartite principle called, for reasons at once obvious and utterly unfathomable, "the Kew Gardens principle"-an allusion to the celebrated Kitty Genovese murder which took place in Kew Gardens,
Queens, in 1964-they conclude that universities do have an obligation
to act. In the final analysis, this principle boils down to nothing more
than "if you are in a position to do anything which will prevent or
eliminate social injury (whether or not self-caused in any usual sense),
and nobody else is going to do anything about it, you ought to do
whatever you can, no matter how futile the effort may appear."
This is one of the major weaknesses of the book. The Kitty
Genovese-Kew Gardens metaphor is no more than a metaphor, and yet
the authors rely heavily upon it; the rigorous analysis to which other
concepts are subjected is temporarily abandoned. One wishes that the
problem of proximate cause had not been passed over so lightly, and
that the authors had taken this occasion to examine in some depth what
it means to be an "investor." Surely the swapping of pieces of paper on
the New York Stock Exchange is not the equivalent of an injection of
13. See, e.g., M. FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM 133 (1962). Whether one adds the
innocent-sounding phrase "in the long run" makes an enormous difference in the thrust of this
argument. Cf. Rostow, To Whom and For What Ends Is Corporate Management Responsible?,
in

THE CORPORATION IN MODERN SOCIETY 46 (E. Mason ed. 1959).
14. See J. SIMON, C. POWERS & J. GUNNEMANN, THE ETHICAL INVESTOR: UNIVERSITIES

AND CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY

109 (1972).
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venture capital, the purchase of a new equity issue, or the purchase of
bonds from an underwriter. Furthermore, the authors failed to recognize the possibility that a valid reason for university action may be pure
political necessity; the alternative to university action may be a mob
outside the president's door-or worse.
Whether universities in fact have the capacity to influence corporate behavior is a very real and fascinating issue, and one that has
figured prominently in corporate responsibility discussions. The authors
believe that universities can be influential so long as they remain shareholders; divestment of a stock is viewed as a desperation move to be
made only after all other tactics have failed. They identify and discuss
twelve possible devices available to the shareholder, ranked in approximate order of aggressiveness. Declining to invest in the stock of a corporation is obviously the least aggressive "action;" divestment is hardly
better. The acquisition of shares for purposes of initiating shareholder
action is ruled out as wholly inappropriate (a decision required by the
adoption of the moral minimum approach) but the authors do go so far
as to approve engaging in or even initiating litigation to enjoin harmful
activity under specified conditions. Between these extremes, the book
points out a wide range of possible actions designed to influence management, either by direct communication, through the proxy machinery,
or by implication, through a combination of the two. It is interesting
and initially somewhat curious to note that making public pronouncements in connection with other forms of shareholder action is viewed
as the most aggressive tactic, outranking even litigation. On reflection,
however, this judgment may well be correct. The fundamental issue
would seem to be whether universities and other concerned institutional
investors can affect the cost of capital to a given corporation. Looking
at the question from the point of view of raw market power, the answer
for any major corporation is probably negative, but when considerations
of adverse publicity are factored in, this answer would seem to be in
doubt.
The ability of institutional investors to affect the cost of capital
would appear to be a fertile field for empirical analysis. In any given
case, it may be difficult to determine a clear cause-and-effect relationship between external events and the movement of stock prices because
of the number of variables involved, but perhaps one could obtain some
meaningful results on an aggregate basis."5 A correlation of changes in
15. One may only speculate whether, for example, the price behavior of General Motors
stock over the past 2 years may have been less favorable than pure business or economic considerations would warrant. If this were the case, it might indicate that Campaign GM had deferred
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bond rating with shareholder activity might further indicate that minority shareholders can have a significant influence on the cost of capital.
Until such studies are undertaken, however, one can only guess at the
economic effects of efforts to reform corporate conduct.
The ultimate product of the Yale seminar is a set of suggested
guidelines the purpose of which is to: "establish criteria and procedures
pursuant to which the university will respond to requests from members
of the university community that the university take into account factors
in addition to maximum economic return when making investment decisions and when exercising its rights as a shareholder.""6 The guidelines
themselves are reasonably brief, and the criteria they establish are general because the authors envision a case-by-case development of a concrete body of precedent which will provide guidance for future decisions.
Hypothetical cases are given to illustrate the operation of the guide17
lines.
The guidelines recommend that the president and trustees of the
institution appoint a committee or council drawn from all walks of
university life. This group is to respond to requests (it is definitely not
to be a roving commission), establish facts on the basis of evidence, and
make recommendations for action to the trustees, who in turn are asked
to indulge a presumption in favor of the council's recommendations.
The pattern of organization suggested by The Ethical Investor is
the same one actually adopted, with minor variations, by nearly every
university which has grappled with the problem. The committees or
councils that have been established as a result have been left, by and
large, to establish their own procedures, and more importantly, to define
their real function. As a result, they undoubtedly will go through protracted identity crises. Perhaps this is unavoidable, but the authors of
The Ethical Investor could have been more explicit about the way in
which the investment council should approach the decision-making-or
rather, recommendation-making-process itself. One's initial impression is that such a body is supposed to function in much the same way
as the staff of an administrative agency, with the trustees cast in the role
of the commissioners. 8 Undoubtedly there are significant differences
numerous potential purchasers. Similar findings for Gulf and other companies subjected to heavy
shareholder pressures would certainly tend to reinforce such a conclusion.
16. J. SIMON, C. POWERS & J. GUNNEMANN, supra note 14, at 171.
17. One may take issue with the proposed handling of some of the cases, and it will be a
rare lawyer who cannot posit slightly more complex factual situations that would make the decisions difficult. This is not a very telling criticism. The "common law" technique proposed by the
authors does permit decisionmakers over a period of time to sharpen their rules and their techniques of application.
18. The Securities and Exchange Commission perhaps offers a useful analogy.
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between these relationships, but the adoption by an investment council
of some working assumptions based on such an analogy might lend a
certain coherence to the council's work and minimize frustration.
One significant practical problem which is alluded to only in passing is that of the expense and time which must be invested in factfinding
if the forthcoming recommendations for action are to have a sound
basis. To give an example, a recent effort by Harvard University to
gather sufficient facts to permit the Harvard trustees to make an informed decision on the University's ownership of Gulf Oil stock involved many weeks of full-time work by a presidential assistant, including a trip to Angola. 9 Clearly not even a major university can afford
to incur expenses of this magnitude on a regular basis, and for a small
institution such thorough investigations are out of the question. To solve
this problem, a number of educational institutions and foundations have
recently established the Investor Responsibility Research Center. 2 The
Center will be operated on a membership basis; the cost of membership
will be determined by the size of the institutional portfolio. Its functions
will be to keep its members abreast of developing corporate responsibility issues and to publish factual background papers on issues involving
companies whose stocks are widely held by institutional investors. To
the extent that the Center or some similar institution succeeds, university corporate responsibility committees and councils will be able to
serve a useful purpose. Messrs. Simon, Powers, and Gunnemann have
demonstrated conclusively that neither the issues nor the procedures can
be significantly simplified if the results of university inquiries are to be
meaningful, but it is equally clear that volunteer committees cannot
sustain the burden of fact finding; it is more than enough to ask for
analysis of the facts and for recommendations.
The Ethical Investor is, despite its flaws, as thorough and comprehensive a treatment of the problems of universities and corporate
responsibility as might be desired. It should be required reading for
university trustees, and it offers many valuable insights to the general
reader. Although it may appear that student and faculty interest has
diminished somewhat during the past two years, it is nearly a certainty
that this has been more the result of an intelligent and sincere response
by university administrators and trustees than of any profound change
in the climate of opinion. If the universities continue to respond in a
19. See Farber, Gulf and Angola, HARVARD UNIVERSITY GAZETrE, Oct. 6, 1972.
20. See Wall Street J., Dec. 14, 1972, at 14, col. 4.
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thoughtful and reasonable way, they can make an enormous contribution to the cause of social justice, and they need not suffer in the
process.
W. LESLIE PEAT*
Endowment Recording Secretary and Assistant to the Vice President for Investments,
Dartmouth College. A.B. 1962, Hamilton College; M.A., LL.B. 1966, Yale University.
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